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he Charitable Contributions Deduction:  
Federal Tax Rules
HARVEY P. DALE & ROGER COLINVAUX*
Abstract
his Article provides a succinct overview of the main federal income tax 
law rules afecting charitable contributions. his Article covers all principal 
topics, including: eligibility to receive deductible contributions, eligible gifts, 
the amount allowed as a deduction, the speciic rules for gifts of noncash 
property, contributions to certain split-interest trusts, substantiation rules, 
and valuation. his Article also touches on the estate and gift tax chari-
table deduction and provides a survey of select policy issues, including the 
rationale and form of the tax beneit, concerns about eiciency, the ability 
to deduct the appreciation in value of property, a nonitemizer deduction, 
and simpliication.
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I.  Introduction 
he United States has allowed an income tax deduction1 to individual and 
corporate donors2 for charitable contributions since 1917.3 In the typical 
case—a donation of cash to a public charity—the donor may deduct the 
amount of cash donated.4 he amount of the deduction generally may not 
exceed, in the case of an individual, 50% of the individual’s “contribution 
base,”5 or in the case of a corporation, ten percent of its taxable income.6 
Even slight deviations from the plain vanilla situation, however, may call 
into play a variety of complex rules with the potential to change the amount 
of, or even wholly to deny, the charitable contributions deduction. hese 
rules depend on the form of the gift, whether the gift is of cash or property, 
the type of property donated, and the nature of the donee organization. 
1 A charitable deduction also is allowed for estate and gift tax purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 2055, 
2522. his Article focuses on the income tax deduction but also briely describes the estate and 
gift tax rules. See infra text accompanying notes 185-197. 
2 Donations by partnerships, S corporations, and certain other pass-through entities are 
allowed to the partners, shareholders, etc., rather than being allowed to the entity. See, e.g., 
§§ 702(a)(4), 703(a)(2)(C), 1366(a)(1). Charitable donations by trusts or estates are subject 
to a diferent regime under section 642(c).
3 War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). he federal 
income tax was enacted four years earlier.
4 See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
5 § 170(b)(1)(A). An individual’s “contribution base” is his or her adjusted gross income 
computed without any net operating loss carrybacks. § 170(b)(1)(G).
6 § 170(b)(2); see infra note 82. 
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his Article provides a succinct overview of the main federal tax law rules 
afecting charitable contributions.7 his Article covers all principal topics, 
including: eligibility to receive deductible contributions, eligible gifts, the 
amount allowed as a deduction, the speciic rules for gifts of noncash prop-
erty, contributions to split-interest trusts, substantiation rules, and valuation. 
his Article also touches on the estate and gift tax charitable deduction and 
provides a survey of select policy issues.
II.  Eligible Donees of Deductible Contributions
It is often said that gifts to organizations, as deined in section 501(c)(3), 
are eligible for the charitable contributions deduction.8 hat statement, how-
ever, is both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because gifts to 
organizations that test for public safety are not eligible for the deduction 
even though such organizations are listed in section 501(c)(3).9 It is under-
inclusive because the section allowing the deduction—section 170(c)—men-
tions ive types of eligible donee entities, only one of which is closely similar 
to those described in section 501(c)(3).
Nevertheless, by far the most important class of eligible donees is described 
in section 170(c)(2)(B), the words of which are closely similar to, but not 
identical to, the words of section 501(c)(3). his class comprises entities 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientiic, lit-
erary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international ama-
teur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals.”10 For such entities to be eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts, 
additional statutory criteria must be satisied:
7 A helpful publication is also available from the Service: IRS, IRS Pub. No. 526, Chari-
table Contributions (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Publication-526,-Charita-
ble-Contributions-1.
8 For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, Justice Powell, concurring, wrote: 
“Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations ‘operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientiic, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes . . . .’ 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)
(3). he Code also permits a tax deduction for contributions made to these organizations. 
§ 170(c).” 461 U.S. 574, 606 (1983); see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 
461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (“Taxpayers who contribute to § 501(c)(3) organizations are per-
mitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax 
returns . . . .”).
9 Rev. Rul. 65-61, 1965-1 C.B. 234; G.C.M. 32,399 (Sept. 21, 1962), modiied by G.C.M. 
32,519 (Feb. 20, 1963); § 170(c)(2)(B) (omitting public safety organizations but including 
other organizations described in section 501(c)(3)). 
10 § 170(c)(2)(B). he quoted language is identical to that in section 501(c)(3) with the 
exception that organizations that test for public safety are included in the latter but not in the 
former. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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• he entity must be created or organized within the United States or its 
possessions,11
• he entity must not permit proscribed inurement of beneits to 
insiders,12
• he entity must not engage in political campaign activity,13 and
• he entity must not engage in substantial lobbying.14
Further, although not an explicit statutory requirement, the entity must not 
violate fundamental public policy, per the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bob Jones University.15
No income tax charitable contributions deduction is allowed unless the 
charitable donee is organized within the United States.16 his limitation is 
subject to two important qualiications. First, eligible U.S. charitable donees 
may use their funds abroad for charitable purposes.17 Second, a donor may 
donate to a U.S. charity that, in turn, donates to a foreign charity.18 However, 
the Service has denied deductions in such a case if the intermediate U.S. 
charity is a mere conduit, that is, if “the domestic organization is only nomi-
nally the donee,” but “the real donee is the ultimate foreign recipient.”19 he 
11 Section 170(c)(2)(A) states that the donee must be “created or organized in the United 
States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District 
of Columbia, or any possession of the United States.” his restriction derives from 1935 
legislation afecting corporate donations (section 102(c) of the Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. 
No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935), adding a new section 23(r) to the Revenue Act of 
1934), and 1938 legislation afecting individual donations (section 23(o) of the Revenue Act 
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447, 463 (1938)).
12 § 170(c)(2)(C). For a critique of conditioning the deduction on the nondistribution con-
straint see Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, he Case for For-Proit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017 
(2007). But see Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1213 (2010) (refuting 
critique).
13 § 170(c)(2)(D); Reg. § 1.170A-1(j)(5)(ii).
14 § 170(c)(2)(D); Reg. § 1.170A-1(j)(5)(i).
15 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). For a discussion of the limitations 
of the public policy doctrine see Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 397 (2005). hese and other rules relating to the charitable deduction and 
tax exemption are discussed in Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Histori-
cal Development and Present Law of the Federal Tax Exemption for Charities and 
Other Tax-Exempt Organizations (Comm. Print 2005).
16 See § 170(c)(2)(A). 
17 he legislative history to the 1938 legislation (see supra note 11) explicitly conirmed this. 
H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938). Treasury regulations state that “all, or some portion, of 
the funds of the [donee] organization may be used in foreign countries for charitable or edu-
cational purposes.” Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(1). For inexplicable reasons, however, U.S. corporate 
donors are only allowed a deduction for donations to a U.S. corporate charity (as opposed to a 
noncorporate trust, community chest, or fund) if that domestic charity in turns uses its funds 
abroad. § 170(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65.
18 See Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101 (examples 4 and 5); see also Rev. Rul. 66-79, 
1966-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65; Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79.
19 See Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101 (examples 1, 2, and 3).
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deduction nevertheless may be allowed even if the intermediate U.S. donee 
gives funds only to a particular named foreign entity;20 such U.S. intermedi-
ate entities are sometimes called “friends of” organizations because they are 
frequently so named.21 he intermediate donee must not be bound, by any 
charter or bylaw provision, to deliver the funds to the foreign organization; 
gifts by the intermediate donee to the foreign organization must be within 
the mission and purpose of the U.S. intermediate entity; and the U.S. inter-
mediate organization must exercise some appropriate level of scrutiny over 
the foreign donee to make sure that it qualiies as an eligible organization.22
he place-of-organization limitation does not apply for purposes of the 
gift tax or estate tax.23 he Code, however, generally requires section 501(c)
(3) organizations (other than certain religious groups or very small organiza-
tions) to notify the Service and to apply for a determination letter conirming 
their section 501(c)(3) status within 27 months of their organization.24 his 
requirement applies to foreign organizations unless they derive less than 15% 
of their “support”25 from U.S. sources.26 A foreign organization that is not 
excused from this requirement but that fails to comply with it is not “treated 
as an organization described in section 501(c)(3),”27 and donors to it may be 
denied gift tax and estate tax charitable contributions deductions for their 
gifts.28
20 Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; see also Rev. Rul. 74-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142.
21 See, e.g., Judith S. Ballan, How to Aid a Foreign Charity hrough an “American Friends of ” 
Organization, 23 N.Y.U. Conf. Tax Plan. for Section 501(c)(3) Org’s ch. 4 (1994).
22 See generally Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 Tax Law. 657, 659-63 (1995); Kimberly 
S. Blanchard, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Charities, 8 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 719, 726 (1993).
23 Sections 2055(a)(2), 2055(a)(3), and 2522(a)(2) lack the restrictive language of section 
170(c)(2)(A). he gift tax regulations conirm that “[t]he deduction is not limited to gifts for 
use within the United States, or to gifts to or for the use of domestic corporations, trusts, com-
munity chests, funds, or foundations . . . .” Reg. § 25.2522(a)-1(a). he estate tax regulations, 
in almost identical language, agree. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a). he charitable contributions deduc-
tion allowed to estates and complex trusts, per section 642(c)(1), is also “determined without 
regard to [the place-of-formation limitation in] section 170(c)(2)(A).” he regulations again 
conirm this. Reg. § 1.642(c)-1(a)(2).
24 Section 508(a) mandates the notice requirement. Regulation section 1.508-1(a)(2)(i) pre-
scribes the use of Form 1023 and states that it must be iled within 15 months from the end 
of the month of organization. Section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 92-85, 1992-2 C.B. 490, 
grants an automatic 12-month extension of this 15-month time period.
25 For this purpose, “support” includes gifts, grants, contributions, membership fees, gross 
receipts from admissions or sales or furnishing facilities, and net income from unrelated busi-
ness activities but does not include “gross investment income.” I.R.C. §§ 4948(b), 509(d), 
509(e). Gifts, grants, contributions, and membership fees paid by U.S. persons are treated as 
from U.S. sources. Reg. § 53.4948-1(b).
26 § 4948(b); Reg. § 53.4948-1(b). Under certain circumstances, even such excepted foreign 
charities may cease to be eligible to receive donations that are deductible for gift and estate tax 
purposes if they engage in a “prohibited transaction” and the Commissioner so notiies them. 
§ 4948(c); Reg. § 53.4948-1(c)-(d).
27 I.R.C. § 508(a).
28 §§ 508(d)(2)(B), 2055(e)(1), 2522(c)(1).
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Because it may be di cult for potential donors to ascertain whether a 
prospective donee satisies all of these conditions for eligibility, the Service 
publishes online a list of eligible donees and updates it regularly.29 Donors 
making gifts in reliance on that published list, as modiied by occasional pub-
lic announcements by the Service, are generally protected even if the donee 
organization ceases to qualify.30
Donees eligible to receive deductible contributions other than section 
170(c)(2)(B) organizations are (1) states, possessions, political subdivisions, 
and the District of Columbia, (2) posts or organizations of war veterans, 
(3) domestic fraternal societies, and (4) cemetery companies. Further condi-
tions on eligibility are imposed for each type.31
III.  Eligible Gifts
A deduction is allowed for a “charitable contribution.” A “charitable con-
tribution” is deined as “a contribution or gift to or for the use of” an eli-
gible organization.32 here is no statutory deinition of “contribution or gift.” 
Some early court decisions borrowed a deinition from another part of the 
tax law,33 following a United States Supreme Court decision that described 
a “gift” for those purposes as a transfer proceeding from “detached and dis-
interested generosity.”34 his line of authority, however, fell into disfavor, in 
part because of its reliance on the subjective intent of the transferor–donor.35 
Preferring to focus on objective factors, the United States Supreme Court, in 
United States v. American Bar Endowment, articulated the test as follows: “he 
29 IRS Publication 78, Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, lists all eligible charities on the Service Master File. he publication 
is available and may be searched on the Service’s website at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-
Non-Proits/Exempt-Organizations-Select-Check, but is not separately published as a paper 
version.
30 See Rev. Proc. 2011-33, 2011-25 I.R.B. 887 for a general discussion of the extent to 
which such reliance will be protected. he Service reserves the right to challenge deductions, 
even if the donee organization was listed in IRS Publication 78, if the donor knew of the revo-
cation of the charity’s exempt status, was aware that it was imminent, or was in part responsible 
for or aware of the actions giving rise to the revocation. Id. § 3.01.
31 I.R.C. § 170(c).
32 § 170(c).
33 § 102.
34 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960); see also DeJong v. Commis-
sioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying the subjective Duberstein test).
35 See, e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (declining to apply the 
Duberstein test).
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sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property 
without adequate consideration.”36
Treasury regulations adopted in 1996 now state that no transfer will be 
treated as “a contribution or gift” unless the donor “[i]ntends to make a pay-
ment in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services 
[received in exchange for the payment]” and “makes a payment in an amount 
that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services.”37 he second leg 
of that test is purely objective; the irst leg derives from a sentence in American 
Bar Endowment in which the United States Supreme Court said, “A pay-
ment of money generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the 
contributor expects a substantial beneit in return.”38 However, because of the 
substantiation requirements discussed below,39 the irst leg of the test does not 
have much practical signiicance. 
Charitable gifts must be made either “to” or “for the use of” an eligible 
donee; this distinction afects the deduction limitation for an individual 
donor and is discussed further below.40 Gifts must be complete and uncon-
ditional to qualify for a deduction: retention of control by the donor, or the 
existence of conditions that might defeat the gift, may postpone or prevent 
deductibility.41 he Treasury regulations state the test:
36 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986). hree years later, the Court commented approvingly on the 
American Bar Endowment objective test saying, “his practice has the advantage of obviating 
the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpay-
ers.” Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1989); see also Rolfs v. Commis-
sioner, 668 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he IRS and the courts look to the 
objective features of the transaction, not the subjective motives of the donor”). See generally 
Douglas A. Kahn & Jefrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts”—he Income Tax Deinition and 
Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justiication for the Exclusion 
of Gifts from Income, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 441, 495-524 (2003).
37 Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1), adopted by T.D. 8690, 1997-5 I.R.B. 5. he Service took this 
position in rulings prior to adoption of the regulations. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 
C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
38 477 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added). 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 144-164. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 67-72.
41 See, e.g., Briggs v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 646 (1979) (conditions on donated property 
not negligible; held: deduction denied), af’d without opinion, 665 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981); 
885 Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 156 (1990) (court found it “doubtful” that condition 
on use of donated property would be met; held: deduction denied); Rev. Rul. 73-1, 1973-1 
C.B. 117 (donor’s retained option to require repayment of donated amounts fatal to deduc-
tion); Rev. Rul. 77-305, 1977-2 C.B. 72 (donor’s power to compel donee to sell donated prop-
erty and accept cash instead fatal to deduction); see also United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 
(1st Cir. 1955). See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, he Case for the Taxpaying Good Samaritan: 
Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law, heory and Policy, 
70 Fordham L. Rev. 1243 (2002); John McGown, Jr., Major Charitable Gift—How Much 
Control Can Donors Keep and Charities Give Up?, 91 J. Tax’n 279 (1999); Ronald W. Blasi & 
Richard A. Denesha, Avoiding Disallowance of Earmarked Charitable Contributions, 9 Rev. 
Tax’n Individuals 160 (1985).
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If as of the date of a gift a transfer for charitable purposes is dependent 
upon the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in 
order that it might become efective, no deduction is allowable unless the 
possibility that the charitable transfer will not become efective is so remote 
as to be negligible.42
Designations of particular purposes for gifts or imposition of conditions that 
are extremely unlikely to interfere with the donee’s interests are not fatal43 but 
may afect valuation of the gift and so the amount of the deduction.44
Gifts of less than the donor’s entire interest in the property donated do not 
qualify for a charitable contributions deduction.45 here are ive exceptions 
to this rule:
1. Gifts of remainder interests in charitable remainder trusts,46
2. Gifts of lead interests in charitable lead trusts,47
42 Reg. § 1.170A-1(e); accord Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(3). he quoted language leaves room, 
however, for certain conditions so long as the likelihood of their occurrence is deemed “so 
remote as to be negligible.” he Regulation goes on to conirm this:
If an interest in property passes to, or is vested in, charity on the date of the gift and 
the interest would be defeated by the subsequent performance of some act or the hap-
pening of some event, the possibility of occurrence of which appears on the date of 
the gift to be so remote as to be negligible, the deduction is allowable. For example, 
A transfers land to a city government for as long as the land is used by the city for 
a public park. If on the date of the gift the city does plan to use the land for a park 
and the possibility that the city will not use the land for a public park is so remote 
as to be negligible, A is entitled to a deduction under section 170 for his charitable 
contribution.
Reg. § 1.170A-1(e). Pre-1972, the regulations had used the phrase “highly improbable” instead 
of “so remote as to be negligible.” T.D. 6285, 1958-1 C.B. 127. The change to the current 
language was made by T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106. 
43 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-148, 1977-1 C.B. 63, supported by G.C.M. 36,980 (Jan. 11, 1977) 
(gift of timberland on condition that land would revert to donor if within 90 years donees 
attempted to sell land or remove trees; held: because donees were conservation organization 
and the United States, both accepting gift of land for use as wildlife preserve, possibility of 
reverter was so remote as to be negligible, so current deduction allowed).
44 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-99, 1985-2 C.B. 83, supported by G.C.M. 39,380 (July 9, 1985) 
(gift of land to agricultural college on condition it was to be used only for agricultural pur-
poses; held: deduction allowed, but land valued as agricultural even though worth more if free 
of that restriction); accord Deukmejian v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 738, 1981 T.C.M. 
(P-H) ¶ 81,024 (condition insisted on by donee); Fargason v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1032 
(1930) (reviewed by the Board) (condition imposed by donor).
45 I.R.C. § 170(f )(3); Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(1); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 C.B. 594.
46 § 170(f )(2)(A) (which includes pooled income funds as well as charitable remainder 
annuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts).
47 § 170(f )(2)(B).
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3. Gifts of an undivided interest in the entire property owned by the 
donor,48
4. Gifts of remainder interests in a personal residence or farm,49 and
5. Qualiied conservation donations.50
Although a deduction for the gift of an undivided interest (i.e., a frac-
tion) of a donor’s entire interest in property is allowed, this is so only if the 
donor (or the donor and donee in combination) owns the entire interest in 
the property immediately before the contribution and other requirements are 
met.51 For example, a donor is allowed a deduction for donating a percent-
age interest in a painting to a museum if the donor owned the entire paint-
ing prior to the contribution. However, any deduction is later recaptured if 
the donor does not eventually give the entire interest in the painting to the 
donee museum and if the donee fails to exercise its percentage interest by, for 
example, not taking substantial physical possession of the painting or by fail-
ing to use the painting in a related use.52 In addition, special valuation rules 
apply to each fractional gift (after the initial gift).53
Gifts of services are not eligible for a charitable contributions deduction.54
IV.  Amount of Deduction
An eligible donee, the absence of a substantial return beneit, and a gift of 
the donor’s entire interest are the main determinants of whether a charitable 
contributions deduction is allowed.55 he amount allowed as a deduction, 
however, depends on a variety of factors and often requires application of 
complex rules.
An important factor determining the amount allowed as a deduction is 
whether the donee is classiied either as a public charity or a private foun-
dation, with a more generous allowance provided for donations to public 
48 § 170(f )(3)(B)(ii); Reg. §§ 1.170A-5(a)(2), -7(b)(1)(i). If, however, the donor subdivides 
property for the purpose of avoiding this rule, no deduction is then allowed even for a dona-
tion of the entire subdivided property. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(2)(i).
49 § 170(f )(3)(B)(i); Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(3) (personal residence); Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(4) 
(farm).
50 § 170(f )(3)(B)(iii), (h); Reg. §§ 1.170A-7(b)(5), -14. hese contributions are briely dis-
cussed below.
51 § 170(o). his rule was enacted as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-280, § 1218(a), 120 Stat. 780.
52 § 170(o)(3). he legislative history provides that the related use requirement would be 
satisied if, for example, an art museum “includes the painting in an art exhibit sponsored by 
the museum.” Staff of J. comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., General Explanation of 
Tax Legislation Enacted in the 109th Cong. 603 (Comm. Print 2007).
53 § 170(o)(2).
54 Reg. § 1.170A-1(g). For a discussion of the nondeductibility of services, see Henry 
Ordower, Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning for Nonitemizers, 67 
Tax Law. 517 (2014).
55 See § 170(o)(1).
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charities. he default classiication is a private foundation.56 Private founda-
tions typically are founded and funded by a large donor who retains con-
trol over the organization. By contrast, to escape private foundation status, a 
public charity must show that a certain amount of its support derives from 
suiciently public sources, through satisfaction of a detailed public support 
test.57 Alternatively, a section 501(c)(3) organization may qualify as a pub-
lic charity because of its function and role in the community; for example: 
hospitals, colleges and universities, and churches automatically are public 
charities.58 Public charity status is also provided to supporting organizations, 
which receive such status derivatively through support of an established pub-
lic charity.59
A.  Quid Pro Quo
As noted above, a charitable contributions deduction is allowed even if 
goods or services are received in exchange for a contribution so long as the 
payments to the charity exceed the value of the quid pro quo received by the 
donor. However, the amount of the deduction is reduced by the value of the 
return beneits.60 he Treasury regulations provide a safe harbor for the donor 
to rely, in good faith, on a written statement provided by the donee setting 
forth the value of any goods or services received by the donor in exchange for 
the payment.61 For these purposes, the value of certain small items provided 
to the donor may be ignored,62 intangible religious beneits are not taken 
into account,63 and recognition, praise, and even naming opportunities are 
disregarded.64
56 I.R.C. § 509(a).
57 §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(iv), (vi), 509(a)(1)-(2).
58 §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), 509(a)(1). For a discussion of the public charity-private founda-
tion distinction, see Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 
Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 53-64 (2011).
59 § 509(a)(3).
60 Relatedly, if a deduction is allowed by reason of a sale for less than the fair market value of 
the property, the donor will recognize gain on the sale portion. I.R.C. § 1011(b).
61 Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(4).
62 Reg. § 1.170A-13(f )(8)(i), referring to Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, ampliied by 
Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 C.B. 987, and modiied by Rev. Proc. 92-102, 1992-2 C.B. 579.
63 See I.R.C. § 6115(b). IRS, IRS Pub. No. 1771, Charitable Contributions—Substan-
tiation and Disclosure Requirements 7-8 (Rev. 2013), states:
What are “intangible religious beneits?” Generally, they are beneits provided by a tax 
exempt organization operated exclusively for religious purposes, and are not usually 
sold in commercial transactions outside a donative (gift) context. Examples include 
admission to a religious ceremony and a de minimis tangible beneit, such as wine 
used in a religious ceremony. Beneits that are not intangible religious beneits include 
education leading to a recognized degree, travel services, and consumer goods.
IRS Pub. No. 1771, supra.
64 E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383; Rev. Rul. 
77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193; see also Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(f )(3), Ex. (2); Reg. §§ 53.4941(d)-2(f )
(2), (4), Ex. (4).
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A notable controversy about charitable contributions and return beneits 
involved the Church of Scientology. he Service initially ruled in 1978 that 
no deduction was available to a donor who received, in exchange for the 
donation, “auditing,” “training,” and “processing” courses, and other servic-
es.65 After lengthy litigation, the Service’s position denying deductions to 
some donors was sustained by the United States Supreme Court.66 At the 
same time, the Service separately determined that Scientology organizations 
were not tax exempt because they permitted personal inurement (to the ben-
eit of founder L. Ron Hubbard), conducted extensive commercial activities, 
and contravened fundamental public policy by violating the law. Here, again, 
the Service was sustained by the courts.67 Eventually, after the death of L. Ron 
Hubbard, the Service and the Scientologists announced a settlement under 
which the Scientology organizations would be recognized, once more, as tax 
exempt. Subsequently, the Service issued a ruling that “obsoleted” the 1978 
ruling that had started the entire process.68 Although the text of the closing 
agreement between the Scientology organizations and the Service was even-
tually made public, nothing in the closing agreement explains the Service’s 
change of stance in abandoning its prior ruling position that was sustained by 
the United States Supreme Court.69
B.  Percentage Limitations and Carryovers
he charitable contributions deduction is subject to a cap that is calculated 
as a percentage of a “contribution base.”70 he applicable percentage depends 
on the type of donee, whether the donation is “to” or “for the use” of the 
donee, whether the contribution is cash or property, and whether the contri-
bution is by an individual or corporation. 
A 50% limitation is generally available for gifts made by individuals “to” 
a public charity.71 Gifts “for the use of” public charities are deductible only 
up to 30% of the individual donor’s contribution base.72 he United States 
65 Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 C.B. 68.
66 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 703 (1989) (a ive-to-two decision with two 
Justices recusing).
67 E.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 525-26 (1984), af’d on 
other grounds, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
68 Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75.
69 See 19 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 227, 227 (1998). In a later unrelated case, the Service 
denied claimed deductions for amounts paid for both secular and religious education. Sklar v. 
Commissioner, 282 F.3d 610, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) (airming disallowance of the deduction 
on the ground that the donors had not shown that the value of the secular education received 
was less than the amount of the payments); see also Sklar v. Commissioner, 549 F.3d 1252, 
1267 (9th Cir. 2008).
70 I.R.C. § 170(b).
71 § 170(b)(1)(A). he 50% limitation also applies for gifts to government entities.
72 § 170(b)(1)(A), (B). he third sentence of Regulation section 1.170A-8(b) reads, “To 
qualify for the 50-percent limitation the contributions must be made ‘to’, and not merely ‘for 
the use of,’ one of the speciied organizations.” Reg. § 1.170A-8(b).
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Supreme Court has said that “a gift or contribution is ‘for the use of ’ a quali-
ied organization when it is held in a legally enforceable trust for the qualiied 
organization or in a similar legal arrangement.”73 Gifts of an income interest 
in property, whether or not in trust, are treated as made “for the use of” the 
charitable recipient,74 but gifts of a qualiied remainder interest are gener-
ally treated as made “to” the charitable recipient.75 Unreimbursed expenses 
incurred in connection with rendering services to a charity are deductible and 
are treated as made “to” the charity76 even though no deduction is permitted 
for a donation of services themselves.
Gifts of “capital gain property” made by an individual to a public charity 
qualify only for a 30%, rather than the usual 50%, limitation.77 Capital gain 
property is any capital asset the sale of which by the donor at fair market value 
would give rise to long-term capital gain;78 thus, gifts of appreciated stock or 
securities often fall under the 30% limitation. Donors may elect to reduce the 
amount of such gifts by the amount of any long-term capital gain, in which 
case the balance is deductible under the larger, 50% limitation.79
An individual’s gifts to private foundations generally may only be deducted 
up to 30% of the individual’s contribution base.80 Furthermore, gifts of capi-
tal gain property to private foundations are subject to a still-smaller 20% 
limitation.81
Gifts by corporations are subject to a more straightforward, single ten per-
cent limitation.82 Corporations on the accrual basis of accounting may elect 
73 Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 485 (1990); see also Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 
676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982), acq. 1984-2 C.B. 1.
74 Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2).
75 Id.
76 Rev. Rul. 84-61, 1984-1 C.B. 39, accepting the result in Rockefeller. his position is now 
enshrined in the regulations. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g).
77 § 170(b)(1)(C)(i).
78 § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv).
79 § 170(b)(1)(C)(iii). he election is made by attaching a statement to the donor’s tax 
return, referring to section 170(b)(1)(C)(iii) and Regulation section 1.170A-8(d)(2)(iii). It 
must cover all contributions of 30% property during the year, per Regulation section 1.170A-
8(d)(2)(i)(a). It has been held generally to be irrevocable. Woodbury v. Commissioner, 900 
F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1990); Grynberg v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 255 (1984).
80 § 170(b)(1)(B). Donations to certain subsets of private foundations, however—including 
private operating foundations and so-called pass-through or conduit foundations—qualify for 
the larger 50% limitation. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii), (b)(1)(E); Reg. §§ 1.170A-9(f ), -9(g), -9(h).
81 § 170(b)(1)(D)(i).
82 § 170(b)(2)(A). A corporation’s contribution base is its “taxable income.” Taxable income 
for this purpose is computed without regard to net operating loss carrybacks, deductions for 
dividends received, capital loss carrybacks, the charitable contributions deduction, and certain 
other deductions. § 170(b)(2)(C); Reg. § 1.170A-11(a). he limitation had been ive percent; 
it was increased to ten percent by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
§ 263(a), 95 Stat. 172, 264. Eforts to increase the limitation to 15% were made but did 
not succeed. See, e.g., Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 107th Cong., Description of an 
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7, The “Community Solutions Act 
Of 2001” (Comm. Print 2001).
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to treat certain charitable gifts made after the close of a given taxable year, but 
before the 15th day of the third month thereafter, as having been made dur-
ing the taxable year;83 the election is not available to S corporations.84
Amounts disallowed by any of the limitations may be carried forward for 
ive years and may be deducted in the future years to the extent to which the 
donor’s gifts made in such years are less than the relevant limitations.85 he 
computations may be complex, particularly if more than one of the relevant 
limitation percentages is involved.86
In recent years, Congress has enacted temporary special rules either increas-
ing or waiving the percentage limitations. Contributions of conservation ease-
ments (technically, “qualiied conservation contributions”)87 normally would 
be subject to the 30% limitation but under a special rule may be deducted up 
to 50% of the individual’s contribution base.88 If the taxpayer is a “qualiied 
farmer or rancher,” including a corporate taxpayer, then the limit is waived 
(i.e., the limit is 100% of the contribution base).89 Contributions in excess 
of any of these limits may be carried forward 15 years, instead of the usual 
ive.90 In addition, in the wake of devastating hurricanes that struck the Gulf 
Coast in the fall of 2005, Congress waived the percentage limitations on a 
temporary basis.91 Congress also passed a special exclusion from income for 
distributions made by an individual from an individual retirement arrange-
ment directly to a qualifying section 501(c)(3) organization.92 Although not 
technically a waiver of the percentage limitations, the efect is to allow certain 
contributions to escape the percentage limitation cap.
he Tax Reform Act of 2014, a discussion draft released by Chairman of 
the Ways and Means Committee Dave Camp, proposes combining the 50% 
83 § 170(a)(2). he election is made by attaching a written declaration to the corporation’s 
tax return for the year. Reg. § 1.170A-11(b)(2). Prudence suggests careful compliance even 
though the courts and the Service have shown some lexibility in forgiving procedural foot-
faults. Columbia Iron & Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 5 (1973), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 1. 
he election may be made as to a portion as well as to all of the donations made during the 2.5 
month window. Rev. Rul. 57-228, 1957-1 C.B. 506.
84 Rev. Rul. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 333.
85 § 170(b)(1)(B), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), 170(d).
86 See, e.g., Reg. § 1.170A-10 (for individuals); Reg. § 1.170A-11(c) (for corporations).
87 § 170(h).
88 § 170(b)(1)(E)(i). hese special rules for conservation easements have expired and been 
extended multiple times since their enactment in 2006. As of this writing, the special rules ter-
minated for contributions made in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2013. § 170(b)
(1)(E)(vi), (2)(B)(iii).
89 § 170(b)(2)(B)(i).
90 § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii), (2)(B)(ii).
91 Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005; Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 301, 119 Stat. 2016; 
§ 1400S(a).
92 I.R.C. § 408(d)(8). he exclusion is available for distributions to a public charity but not 
to a donor advised fund or supporting organization. he provision was irst enacted in 2006 and 
has since expired and been extended multiple times. As of this writing, the exclusion is not avail-
able for distributions made in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2013. § 408(d)(8)(F).
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and 30% limitations applicable for gifts to public charities to a single limita-
tion of 40% and also combining the 30% and 20% limitations applicable for 
gifts to nonoperating private foundations to a single limit of 25%.93
C.  Reductions of Deduction Amount for Noncash Contributions 
For cash contributions, the amount of the deduction is equal to the amount 
of cash contributed (subject to all of the rules described above). For noncash 
contributions (property), the general approach is to allow a deduction equal 
to the fair market value of the property at the time it is contributed. However, 
there are numerous exceptions that result in a reduction (from fair market 
value) of the amount allowed as a deduction.
• Charitable donations of property must be reduced by the amount of 
any ordinary income that would have been recognized if the donor had 
sold the property for its fair market value.94 Common examples are: (1) 
if an artist donates one of her own paintings, her deduction is limited 
to her basis in the painting, that is, the cost of the canvas, frame, paints, 
etc.;95 (2) if a company donates inventory, the deduction is similarly 
limited to cost;96 and (3) if a donor contributes stock held for less than 
one year, again the deduction is so limited.97
• Charitable donations of tangible personal property, if the donee puts 
the property to an unrelated use, must be reduced by the amount of any 
long-term capital gain that would have been recognized if the donor had 
sold the property for its fair market value.98 Sale by the donee within 
three years of the contribution is an unrelated use, thus triggering the 
reduction either in the tax year of the donation or in a later year by 
93 Tax Reform Act of 2014 § 1403(d) (Discussion Draft 2014). he proposal would main-
tain the preference for gifts to public charities rather than private foundations but eliminate 
the preference for cash gifts over in kind giving.
94 § 170(e)(1)(A).
95 Reg. §§ 1.170A-4(a)(1), (b)(1) (which speciically states that “a work of art created by the 
donor” is “ordinary income property”); accord Maniscalo v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1174, 1978 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 78,274 (changes to this result are perennially proposed), af’d per 
curiam, 632 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying the taxpayer a charitable contributions deduction 
for a gift to charity of three portraits he painted); see, e.g., he Artist-Museum Partnership Act 
of 2013, H.R. 2482, 113th Cong. (2013); Art and Collectibles Capital Gains Tax Treatment 
Parity Act, S. 930, 112th Cong. (2011).
96 § 170(e)(3), (4), (6). Special rules exist for contributions of certain kinds of inventory 
and other ordinary income producing property, such as food, books, scientiic property used 
for research, and computer technology and equipment. If various requirements are met, then 
the amount allowed as a deduction is the donor’s cost plus one half of the appreciation of the 
property (not to exceed twice the donor’s cost).
97 § 170.
98 § 170(e)(1)(B)(i).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 68, No. 2
 THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS DEDUCTION 345
recapture.99 When the donated property is retained by the donee, the 
Service has opined that:
[A] direct and functional use test must be applied [for determining what 
is unrelated use]. Where a donee does not intend actually to use contrib-
uted appreciated personalty in carrying out its speciic exempt purposes, 
we believe the Code requires the amount of the charitable contribution 
otherwise allowable to be reduced.100
Applying that standard, the Service held that display of donated art by a 
medical school does not constitute “related use,” and thus, the donor must 
reduce the amount of its gift under this rule. By contrast, “if a painting 
contributed to an educational institution is used by that organization for 
educational purposes by being placed in its library for display and study by 
art students, the use is not an unrelated use . . . .”101 Because a donor may 
not always know the actual use to which donated property is put by the 
donee, some safe-harbor rules are provided in regulations.102
• Charitable donations of property to a private foundation must be 
reduced by the amount of any long-term capital gain that would have 
been recognized if the donor had sold the property for its fair mar-
ket value.103 An important exception permits gifts of certain “qualiied 
appreciated stock” without any such reduction.104 he stock must be 
quoted on an established securities market and not more than ten per-
cent of the corporation’s outstanding stock may be so contributed.105
• Charitable donations of intellectual property (e.g., a patent, copyright, 
or trademark) face a similar reduction from fair market value of any 
99 § 170(e)(1)(B)(i)(II), (7). Section 6050L requires donees to report to the Service, with a 
copy to the donor, if any donated property is sold or disposed of within three years after its 
receipt. An appropriate certiication by the donee regarding the use of the property avoids a 
reduction of the deduction (assuming a fair market value deduction was claimed) that would 
otherwise occur through recapture. § 170(e)(7)(D).
100 G.C.M. 38,804 (Oct. 15, 1981).
101 Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
102 Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(ii).
103 § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii). Some private foundations are exempt from this rule. § 170(b)(1)(F).
104 § 170(e)(5).
105 § 170(e)(5). his provision has had a stuttering history: it was enacted by the Deicit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 301(b), 98 Stat. 494, 778; it expired at the end 
of 1994, but was reenacted, efective July 1, 1996, in section 1206(a) of the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1776, with a new “sunset” date 
of May 31, 1997. hat 1997 sunset date, in turn, passed without legislative extension, but the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 602(a), 111 Stat. 788, 862, retroactively 
revived it and extended it to June 30, 1998. It again expired on June 30, 1998, but was once 
more retroactively resuscitated and this time made permanent by the Tax and Trade Relief 
Extension Act of 1998, § 1004(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-888, which amended section 170(e)(5) 
by striking from it subparagraph D, which had contained the sunset provision. his last amend-
ment was made efective for “contributions made after June 30, 1998.”
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long-term capital gain.106 However, if the contributed intellectual prop-
erty generates net income to the donee for up to ten years after the 
contribution, additional charitable contribution deductions are allowed 
to the donor in an amount that is a percentage of such income.107
• Charitable donations of taxidermy are also subject to the long-term 
capital gain reduction rule.108
A reduction under these rules directly afects the amount allowed as a deduc-
tion, that is, no carryover is provided for the amount of the reduction.109
D.  Reduction Rules Afecting Itemized Deductions Generally (Including the 
Charitable Deduction)
he charitable contributions deduction is an itemized deduction.110 his 
means that the roughly two-thirds of taxpayers111 who claim the standard 
deduction are not separately allowed a deduction for charitable contribu-
tions112 but instead claim the simpler, and at least sometimes more gener-
ous, standard deduction.113 Because the amount of the standard deduction 
does not vary with actual charitable donations and is in lieu of certain other 
deductions as well, it provides no incentive to make charitable gifts, and it 
treats equally those nonitemizers who donate to charity and those who do 
not. here is an unavoidable policy tension here between simpliication of 
106 § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii).
107 § 170(m). his rule was enacted as part of he American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-357, § 882, 18 Stat. 1418. he Tax Reform Act of 2014 would repeal this rule. he 
Tax Reform Act of 2014 § 1403(g) (Discussion Draft 2014).
108 § 170(e)(1)(B)(iv).
109 § 170(b)(1)(D)(ii).
110 I.R.C. § 63(e).
111 he Tax Policy Center reports that 66.5% of returns in 2011 claimed the standard deduc-
tion. Types of Deduction 1999–2011, Tax Policy Center, Apr. 29, 2014, http://www.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?DocID=392&Topic2id=30&Topic3id=34.
112 From 1982 to 1986, a nonitemizer charitable contributions deduction was allowed, phas-
ing in during the earlier years until fully efective in 1986. he Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121(a), 95 Stat. 172, 196. It terminated after 1986 and later 
was completely repealed. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 11801(a)(11), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-520.
113 For taxable years beginning in 2014, the standard deduction is $6,200 ($12,400 for a 
joint return of married individuals) for individuals who are less than 65 years old and are nei-
ther blind or heads of households. § 63(c); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. Individu-
als or couples whose charitable contributions exceed those limits are likely to elect to itemize 
their deductions to claim those higher deductions. However, because the standard deduction 
is in lieu of certain other deductions as well as the charitable contributions deduction and 
because there is some cost in preparing the more-detailed tax return required to be iled by 
itemizers, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the amounts given to charity and 
the decision whether to itemize.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 68, No. 2
 THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS DEDUCTION 347
taxpayer compliance burdens on the one hand and a desire for improved 
incentives and horizontal equity among taxpayers on the other.114
An individual’s itemized income tax deductions, including those for chari-
table donations, must be reduced by the lesser of (1) three percent of the 
excess of adjusted gross income over the “applicable amount” or (2) 80% 
of itemized deductions.115 he “applicable amount” was $100,000 when the 
statutory provision was adopted in 1990116 but was subject to inlation adjust-
ments.117 For the last calendar year in which that prior provision was in efect, 
2009, the amount was $166,800.118 Under the currently efective section, the 
“loor” (or “applicable amount”) for 2014 is $305,050 for those iling joint 
returns, $279,650 for heads of households, $254,200 for individuals, and 
$152,525 for married individuals iling separate returns.119 hose amounts 
are subject to inlation adjustments.120
V.  Property Speciic Rules
In addition to the rules described above for inventory, intellectual property, 
and taxidermy, Congress has enacted other, somewhat free-standing, prop-
erty-speciic deduction rules.
A.  Clothing and Household Items 
No deduction is allowed for a contribution of clothing or household items 
(such as furniture, electronics, and appliances) unless the property is in good 
114 For a thoughtful analysis of the history of and policy considerations afecting the non-
itemizer charitable contributions deduction, see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the 
Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 843 (2001). See also Staff of J. Comm. 
on Taxation, 107th Cong., Description and Analysis of Present Law and Propos-
als to Expand Federal Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving (Comm. Print 2001). 
Although a nonitemizer deduction was proposed in 2001, and over the course of several years 
passed both House and Senate in diferent forms, it was not enacted. See, e.g., Tax Relief Act of 
2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005).
115 I.R.C. § 68(a). his provision is often referred to as “Pease” after the Congressman—
Donald J. Pease, D-Ohio, who served in Congress from 1977 until 1993—who authored its 
original version. Not all itemized deductions are included for this purpose: medical expenses, 
investment interest, and casualty or theft losses are excluded. § 68(c). Section 68 was added to 
the Code by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11103, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-406-07. It was extended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13201(b)(3)(e), 13204, 107 Stat. 312, 462. It was then phased 
out, partially starting in 2006 and completely by the end of calendar year 2009, by the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 103(a), 115 
Stat. 38, 44-45. Most recently, it was reinstated by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101(b)(2)(A), 126 Stat. 2313, 2317 (2013).
116 § 68(b)(1).
117 § 68(b)(2).
118 Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3.08, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623, 626.
119 § 68(b)(1); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.14, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
120 § 68(b)(2).
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used condition or better.121 his rule does not apply to a single item valued at 
more than $500 if the donor includes an appraisal with the tax return.
B.  Vehicles
Concerns about abuse in the many car-donation programs run by section 
501(c)(3) organizations122 led to a special rule that limits the amount of the 
deduction to the sales price of the donated vehicle.123 his rule does not apply 
to vehicles with a claimed value of $500 or less or to vehicles that are used or 
substantially improved by the donee. Special substantiation rules apply.
C.  Qualiied Conservation Contributions
A charitable deduction for a qualiied conservation contribution (better 
known as the deduction for conservation easements) is allowed.124 As noted 
above, this is an exception to the rule barring a deduction for contributions of 
a partial property interest.125 he contribution must be exclusively for one of 
four broadly-deined conservation purposes, with special rules applicable to 
easements on buildings in historic districts.126 Detailed regulations apply.127 
Also as noted above, qualiied conservation contributions are preferred to 
other charitable contributions under the percentage limitation and carryover 
rules. Notwithstanding such preferred treatment, the deduction for easement 
contributions also has been criticized for abuses related to valuation and the 
nature of the public beneit derived.128
121 I.R.C. § 170(f )(16). his rule was enacted as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 1216(a), 120 Stat. 780. See also Prop. Reg. § 1.170A-18, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 45,908 (Aug. 7, 2008). In 2005, the staf of the Joint Committee on Taxation proposed 
limiting the deduction for clothing and household items to no more than $500 per taxable 
year, regardless of iling status. Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to 
Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 288-292 (Comm. Print 2005).
122 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-73, Rep. To S. Comm. On Fin., Vehicle 
Donations: Benefits To Charities And Donors, But Limited Program Oversight 
(2003).
123 § 170(f )(12). his rule was enacted as part of he American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 884(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1632-34.
124 § 170(h).
125 § 170(f )(3)(B)(iii).
126 § 170(h)(4)(B), (f )(13) (requiring a iling fee for such contributions).
127 Reg. § 1.170A–14.
128 See Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: he Charitable Deduction or 
a Better Way, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 29 (2011); Roger Colinvaux, he Conservation 
Easement Tax Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2012); 
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We 
Learned and Where Should We Go from Here?, 2013 Utah L. Rev. 687 (2013); Roger Colin-
vaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 Utah 
L. Rev. 755 (2013); Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: he Façade Easement Deduction, Va. 
Tax Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
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VI.  Contributions to Split-Interest Trusts 
Certain sophisticated transactions—involving split-interest gifts (e.g., char-
itable remainder or charitable lead trusts), charitable gift annuities, pooled 
income funds, and the like—are subject to other detailed requirements that 
are generally beyond the scope of this overview to explore. Because of the sub-
stantial aggregate size of charitable remainder trusts, however, a brief descrip-
tion of the basic iscal rules afecting them is set out below.
here are two broad categories of split-interest charitable trusts: charitable 
lead trusts (in which the charitable beneiciary’s interest precedes the inter-
est of noncharitable beneiciaries) and charitable remainder trusts (in which 
the reverse is true). Because the aggregate assets that have been donated to 
charitable remainder trusts (CRTs) are much greater than those in charitable 
lead trusts,129 this discussion focuses only on CRTs. Pooled income funds, a 
special form of CRT, are not described.130 As of 2012, the aggregate net assets 
of CRTs amounted to approximately $92 billion.131
CRTs come in two lavors: charitable remainder annuity trusts (CRATs) 
and charitable remainder unitrusts (CRUTs).132 Both have a charitable ben-
eiciary that becomes entitled to the trust assets after the termination of a 
predecessor noncharitable beneiciary’s interest.133 he lead, noncharitable 
interest may either be for a ixed term (not to exceed 20 years) or for the life 
or lives of the noncharitable beneiciary(ies).134 he value of the charitable 
remainder interest—determined on a present-value basis after subtracting the 
value of the lead, noncharitable interest—cannot be less than ten percent of 
the net fair market value of the donation to the trust.135 In a CRAT, the lead 
interest is an annuity, that is, a ixed annual amount speciied or calculable 
at the inception of the trust; the annuity amount cannot be less than ive 
percent nor greater than 50% of the initial value of the trust.136 In a CRUT, 
the lead interest is a ixed annual percentage (speciied at the inception of the 
trust) of the trust assets valued at least once a year; the percentage cannot be 
129 As of 2012, charitable remainder unitrusts, measured both by number of trusts and by 
net assets held, represented over 86% of remainder trusts; less than 14%, by number and net 
assets, were represented by charitable remainder annuity trusts. See Lisa S. Rosenmerkel, Split-
Interest Trusts, Filing Year 2012, Statistics of Income Bulletin 51 (Winter 2014).
130 See generally I.R.C. § 642(c)(5); Reg. § 1.642(c)-5. For further discussion of pooled 
income funds, see Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Charitable Remainder Trusts: Charity Can Begin at 
Home, Am. Law Assoc.-Am. Bar Ass’n Course of Study, ST042 ALI-ABA 465 (June 2012).
131 Rosenmerkel, supra note 129, at 53. hese data were derived from more than 113,000 
returns iled by split-interest trusts.
132 Section 664(d)(1) and section 664(d)(2) respectively.
133 § 664(d)(1)(A), (1)(C), (2)(A), (2)(C).
134 § 664(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
135 § 664(d)(1)(D), (2)(D).
136 § 664(d)(1)(A).
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less than ive percent nor greater than 50%.137 hus, the noncharitable benei-
ciary of a CRAT is entitled to receive the same amount every year regardless 
of the value of the trust, whereas the noncharitable beneiciary of a CRUT is 
entitled to receive an amount that varies from year to year depending on the 
value of the trust.
A donor to a CRT is allowed a charitable contributions deduction for a 
portion of the fair market value of the money and property donated to the 
trust.138 No deduction is permitted unless the trust is either a CRAT or a 
CRUT;139 thus, no deduction is permitted for a donation to a trust in which 
the interest of the lead noncharitable beneiciary is deined solely by refer-
ence to the trust’s “income.”140 he amount of the deduction is calculated by 
apportioning the value of the donation to the CRT between the nonchari-
table lead interest and the charitable remainder interest141 using an interest 
rate (or discount factor) that is ixed by the Service every month. he interest 
rate varies according to market interest rates on U.S. government mid-term 
137 § 664(d)(2)(A). If the trust holds assets that do not have a readily ascertainable fair 
market value, they must be appraised either by an independent trustee or a qualiied appraiser. 
Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(7).
138 he income tax deduction is available under section 170(a)(1), section 170(c), and sec-
tion 170(f )(2)(A). A gift tax deduction is available under sections 2522(a) and 2522(c)(2)
(A). An estate tax deduction is available under sections 2055(a) and 2055(e)(2)(A). CRTs may 
be, and commonly are, created by testamentary gift as well as during a donor’s life. It is often 
prudent, in drafting the CRT documents, to restrict the eligible charitable beneiciaries to 
organizations that meet all of the relevant deinitions, i.e., for income and gift and estate tax 
purposes; this insures eligibility for each of those tax regimes.
139 Section 170(f )(2)(A) denies the income tax deduction. See also Reg. § 1.170A-6(b)(1). 
Section 2522(c)(2)(A) denies the gift tax deduction, and section 2055(e)(2)(A) denies the 
estate tax deduction. A deduction is allowed for donations to pooled income funds, as the 
above subparagraphs of the Code conirm, but (as mentioned above) pooled income funds are 
outside the scope of the current discussion.
140 A deduction is permitted, however, for a contribution to a CRUT that either pays (1) 
the lesser of income or a ixed percentage of the value of its assets (§ 664(d)(3)(A)), or (2) 
that lesser amount with an extra payment out of income in a later year to make up for earlier 
year shortfalls when trust income was less than the unitrust amount (§ 664(d)(3)(B)). he 
former exception is sometimes referred to as a “net income CRUT” or “NICRUT;” the latter 
is sometimes referred to as “net income with make-up CRUT” or “NIMCRUT.” he donor’s 
charitable contribution deduction remains the same whether or not the make-up provision 
is included. § 664(e). he regulations approve a further variety of CRUT, a so-called “lip” 
CRUT, in which only income is paid to the lead, noncharitable beneiciary for a prescribed 
period, following which the trust changes to a standard, ixed percentage of value payout. Reg. 
§ 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(c), added by T.D. 8791, 1999-5 I.R.B. 7; see also the examples in Reg. § 
1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(e). In all of these cases, however, the noncharitable beneiciary’s interest is a 
unitrust interest, albeit modiied by a trust-income limitation. As noted in the text, a pure 
income lead interest will not qualify the split-interest trust as a CRT and no deduction will be 
permitted to a donor to such a trust.
141 his is not an efort to determine the present value of what the charitable remainderman 
will ultimately receive; indeed, it is highly unlikely that the amount of the permitted charitable 
contributions deduction will ever match, on a present-value basis, the amount actually turned 
over to the donee upon the termination of the lead noncharitable interest.
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bonds.142 he present value of the remainder interest is usually treated as 
paid “to,” rather than merely “for the use of” the charitable remainderman;143 
therefore, it may qualify for the higher, 50% limitation if the remainder ben-
eiciary is a public charity.144
he CRT itself is exempt from income taxes so long as it does not generate 
unrelated business income.145 hus, gifts to CRTs of appreciated property 
may be advantageous as the donor is not taxed at the time of contribution 
on the unrealized gain, and the CRT is not taxed on the gain even when it 
is realized upon actual sale of the property by the CRT. A CRT is subject to 
some, but not all, of the private foundation excise tax rules. In all cases, the 
self-dealing prohibitions and the rules against expenditures for prohibited 
purposes apply;146 in certain unusual situations, the excess-business-holdings 
and jeopardy-investment rules may also apply.147
A lead, noncharitable beneiciary is taxable on annuity or unitrust amounts 
paid by the CRT under a four-tier system of tracing income from the CRT 
to the beneiciary.148 he details are beyond the scope of this Article.149 CRTs 
142 Section 7520(a)(2), by cross-reference to section 1274(d)(1), requires that the interest 
rate for any month is calculated: (1) by determining the average market yield during the prior 
month for U.S. obligations with a maturity of more than three but not more than nine years, 
(2) by multiplying that average yield by 120%, and (3) by rounding that result to the nearest 
two-tenths of one percent. he Service issues a monthly ruling setting the rate. A donor is per-
mitted to elect to use the interest rate for the month in which the donation is made to a CRT 
or the rate for either of the prior two calendar months. I.R.C. § 7520(a); Reg. § 1.7520-2(a)(2).
143 Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2). his adopts the result in Tully v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 235 
(1967). If, however, the remainder interest is not paid over outright to the charity but is instead 
held in continuing trust for the charity, the gift will be treated as “for the use of” the charity. 
Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2).
144 Of course, the property donated must otherwise be eligible for the 50% limitation, so, 
e.g., capital gain property will not qualify. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
145 § 664(c)(1). Unrelated business taxable income, however, results in an excise tax equal to 
the amount of such income. § 664(c)(2). his rule, enacted in 2006, changed the prior rule 
under which the CRT’s tax exemption was lost on all of its income for a year in which it had 
unrelated business income. See, e.g., Leila G. Newhall Unitrust v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 236 
(1995), af’d, 105 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1997).
146 I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2), (b)(3)(B); Reg. § 53.4947-1(c)(1)(ii). he annuity or unitrust pay-
ments to any lead, noncharitable beneiciary do not violate the self-dealing prohibitions or the 
other private foundation rules. See Reg. § 53.4947-1(c)(2)(i).
147 hese latter rules apply if there is a charitable lead beneiciary in addition to one or more 
lead, noncharitable beneiciaries. § 4947(a)(2), (b)(3)(B).
148 § 664(b). hus, gain realized by the trust upon sale of donated appreciated property may, 
under some circumstances, be taxed in whole or part to the lead, noncharitable beneiciary.
149 Reg. §§ 1.664-1(d), (e). See generally Martin Hall & Carolyn M. Osteen, Tax Aspects 
of Charitable Giving § 1502.3 (3d ed. 2013); Bruce R. Hopkins, The Tax Law of Chari-
table Giving § 12.2 (2010); Leo L. Schmolka, Income Taxation of Charitable Remainder Trusts 
and Decedents’ Estates: Sixty-Six Years of Astigmatism, 40 Tax L. Rev. 1, 58-60 (1984).
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are subject to other highly complex and technical rules that the Service tends 
to enforce with rigorous and remorseless rigidity.150
VII.  Substantiation 
Under the Code, “[a] charitable contribution shall be allowable as a 
deduction only if veriied under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”151 
Accordingly, lengthy and detailed regulations apply.152 In addition, the Code 
imposes additional speciic requirements, outlined below. Further, a doctrine 
of substantial compliance with the regulations is sometimes applied by the 
courts to allow deductions even if technical defects in satisfying the substan-
tiation rules are present. In the words of Professor Ellen Aprill: “Substantial 
150 he Service has provided considerable guidance on how to draft CRTs. he advice is 
of two kinds: mandatory and optional. he mandatory rules are in Revenue Ruling 72-395, 
1972-2 C.B. 340. hat ruling has been modiied by three subsequent rulings—Revenue Rul-
ing 80-123, 1980-1 C.B. 205; Revenue Ruling 82-128, 1982-2 C.B. 71; and Revenue Ruling 
88-81, 1988-2 C.B. 127—and was also “clariied” by Revenue Ruling 82-165, 1982-2 C.B. 
117. See also Rev. Rul. 92-57, 1992-2 C.B. 123. he optional rules, in the form of safe har-
bor provisions that the Service will automatically accept, are contained in numerous revenue 
procedures. For provisions to qualify trusts as CRATs, see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2003-53, 2003-2 
C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 2003-55, 2003-2 C.B. 242; Rev. Proc. 2003-56, 2003-2 C.B. 249; Rev. 
Proc. 2003-57, 2003-2 C.B. 257; Rev. Proc. 2003-58, 2003-2 C.B. 262; Rev. Proc. 2003-59, 
2003-2 C.B. 268; Rev. Proc. 2003-60, 2003-2 C.B. 274. For provisions to qualify trusts as 
CRUTs, see, for example, Rev. Proc. 2005-52, 2005-2 C.B. 326 (for CRUTs); Rev. Proc. 
2005-53, 2005-34 I.R.B. 339; Rev. Proc. 2005-54, 2005-34 I.R.B. 353; Rev. Proc. 2005-55, 
2005-34 I.R.B. 367; Rev. Proc. 2005-56, 2005-34 I.R.B. 383; Rev. Proc. 2005-57, 2005-34 
I.R.B. 392; Rev. Proc. 2005-58, 2005-34 I.R.B. 402; Rev. Proc. 2005-59, 2005-2 C.B. 412. 
For additional discussion, see Martin Hall & Carolyn M. Osteen, Areas for Reform: Split 
Interest and Partial Interest Gifts (2012), in 24 N.Y.U. Nat’l Center on Philanthropy & 
L. Conf. sec. E 41-45 (2012).
151 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
152 Reg. § 1.170A-13. his Regulation is captioned “Recordkeeping and return requirements 
for deductions for charitable contributions.” It is about 17 pages long. Some of the contents of 
the regulations were a result of an of-Code statutory directive. he Deicit Reduction Act of 
1984 speciically required the Treasury to issue regulations under section 170(a)(1) to require 
taxpayers to secure a qualiied appraisal and attach an appraisal summary to the donor’s tax 
return for property contributions with a claimed value of more than $5,000. Deicit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155, 98 Stat. 494, 691. Section 170(f )(11), enacted 
as part of he American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 883(a), 118 Stat. 
1418, 1631, codiied (and supplemented) many of the substantiation requirements previously 
found in the regulations. In 2008, the Treasury announced proposed regulations that modify 
and add to existing regulations. Prop. Reg. § 170(f )(11), 73 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (Aug. 7, 2008).
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compliance excuses near misses.”153 he scope of the substantial compliance 
doctrine is limited, however,154 and donors are well advised to meet all of the 
precise substantiation requirements of the Code and regulations.155 A general 
principle to be gleaned from the cases is that substantial compliance may 
be found if the errors in substantiation are few, and in large part, the donor 
obtained the required information but merely failed to report it properly—
a substance over form approach. By contrast, if the (even technical) errors 
are many or if critical required information was not obtained, the deduction 
will be disallowed notwithstanding that the only defect was substantiation. 
153 Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules, 14 Fla. Tax 
Rev. 275 (2013); see, e.g., Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 40-42 (1993) (holding that 
attaching an appraisal summary but not the required actual appraisal was substantial compli-
ance with the regulations in part because the essential required information had been pro-
vided in the summary itself ); Simmons v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 215, 2009 
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-208, at 1567 (holding that failure to include the contribution date 
in the appraisal was nonetheless substantial compliance because the Form 8283 attached to 
the return included such date); Consol. Investors Grp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 
601, 614, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-290, at 2140 (holding that an appraisal obtained three 
months too early nevertheless was in substantial compliance with the regulations and so a 
“qualiied appraisal”). he most recent relevant decision is RERI Holdings I, LLC, v. Commis-
sioner, 143 T.C. No. 3 (2014).
154 he scope of the doctrine is uncertain because, as the cases indicate, it will not be clear 
in any given case whether substantial compliance is met. Further, the doctrine arose in the 
context of satisfaction of regulatory requirements not speciic statutory directives. See, e.g., 
Bond, 100 T.C. at 40; Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258, 263-64 (1997), af’d without 
opinion, 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing whether the regulations are “directory” and 
“procedural” or “mandatory”). Congress’s adoption of statutory directives may have largely 
mooted this debate. See Rothman v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1864, 1868, 2012 
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-163, at 1246 (“he substantial compliance doctrine has continuing 
but limited application in a post-section 170(f )(11) world.”). But see Scheidelman v. Com-
missioner, 682 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2012) (relying in passing on substantial compliance 
doctrine to override technical defects of failure to include the date and manner of acquisition 
of property or the property’s cost basis). See also Aprill, supra note 153, at 298-306 (discussing 
these and other cases).
155 See, e.g., Hewitt, 109 T.C. at 264 (holding that failure to obtain a qualiied appraisal was 
grounds for denying a deduction even though the taxpayer’s own valuation was not contested); 
Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, 586, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2007-368, at 
1982, af’d, 364 F. App’x 317 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a “terse” appraisal lacking analy-
sis, completed late by a person without clear expertise, combined with other errors was not 
substantial compliance); Friedman v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1177, 2010 
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-045, at 258 (disallowing deduction where only “generic” descriptions 
of the property were provided leaving no basis to determine the valuation method used or the 
basis for the appraised values); Mohamed v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1814, 1817, 
2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-152, at 1172 (denying deductions of more than $18.5 million 
because the taxpayer, performing his own, largely accurate appraisals, was not a “qualiied 
appraiser”).
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In short, substantiation is a distinct condition of the charitable contributions 
deduction.156
A.  Contributions of Less than $250 
Under a rule enacted in the Pension Protection Act of 2006,157 for contri-
butions in the form of cash, check, or other monetary gift,158 the donor must 
maintain a record of the contribution, such as a bank record (e.g., in the case of 
a gift by check or credit card) or a written communication from the donee.159 
Any such written communication must show the name of the donee, and the 
date and amount of the contribution. Under proposed Treasury regulations, 
this substantiation requirement does not apply to contributions of less than 
$250 to a charitable remainder trust or to unreimbursed expenses of less than 
$250.160 For noncash contributions, donors must either obtain a receipt from 
the donee or, if a receipt is impractical under the circumstances, keep reliable 
written records, as detailed in longstanding regulations.161
B.  Contributions of $250 or More
For gifts of $250 or more (cash or noncash), the Code requires donors to 
obtain a “contemporaneous written acknowledgement” from the donee.162 
he acknowledgement must provide: (1) the amount of cash and a descrip-
tion (but not the value) of any property contributed, (2) whether any quid 
pro quo was provided by the donee, and (3) a description and good faith 
156 See Hewitt, 109 T.C. at 264 (reason for the substantiation rules is to “alert [the Service] 
to potential overvaluations”); Smith, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) at 584, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2007-
368 at 1978 (explaining that the need to alert the Service “exists even though in a particular 
case . . . it turns out that the taxpayer’s deduction was in fact based on the fair market value 
of the property); Mohamed, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1820-21, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-152 
at 1178 (notwithstanding a “harsh” result, “the problems of misvalued property are so great 
that Congress was quite speciic about what the charitably inclined have to do to defend their 
deductions”). Note that an alternative ground for failure to satisfy substantiation requirements 
is reasonable cause. § 170(f )(11)(A)(ii)(II).
157 § 170(f )(17); Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1217(a), 120 
Stat. 780.
158 Proposed regulations provide that a monetary gift includes a gift card, payment by 
credit card, electronic fund transfer, online payment service, or payroll deduction. Prop. Reg. 
§ 1.170A-15(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (Aug. 7, 2008).
159 his general rule applies regardless of the amount of the contribution. However, other 
rules that apply for contributions of $250 or more (described below) supplant the general rule.
160 Prop. Reg. §§ 1.170A-15(e), (g), 73 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (Aug. 7, 2008).
161 Reg. §§ 1.170A-13(b)(1), (2).
162 § 170(f )(8)(A). To be “contemporaneous” the acknowledgment must be received by the 
date the donor’s tax return is iled or due to be iled. § 170(f )(8)(C); Reg. § 1.170A-13(f )(3). 
he legislative history makes clear that “[t]axpayers may not rely solely on a canceled check as 
substantiation for a donation” above the threshold amount. H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 785 
(1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-213, at 565 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). he older (and now obsolete) 
portion of the regulations continues to refer to cancelled checks, but the more recent portion 
requires the donee’s written acknowledgement. Compare Reg. § 1.170A-13(a)(1)(i), with Reg. 
§ 1.170A-13(f )(1).
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estimate of the value of any such quid pro quo.163 Failure to obtain the 
required acknowledgement can result in disallowance of the deduction, not-
withstanding other proof of the contribution.164
C.  Noncash Contributions of More than $500
A donor contributing property with a claimed value of more than $500 
has additional requirements, including iling a Form 8283 with the Service.165 
Form 8283 requires a description of the property, name and address of the 
donee, the date of the contribution, and the value of the property.166 If the 
contribution is more than $5,000, the donor must obtain an appraisal167 of 
the property and summarize information about the appraisal on the Form 
8283. he regulations deine a qualiied appraisal in detail, but inevitably, 
disputes about the requisite content of an appraisal arise. Under court deci-
sions, it seems clear that the failure to obtain an appraisal will result in denial 
of a charitable deduction, but issues of substantial compliance may emerge if 
an appraisal is technically deicient or cursory in analysis.168 For some contri-
butions, the appraisal itself must accompany the donor’s tax return (e.g., art 
valued at $20,000 or more, clothing and household items not in good used 
condition, easements on buildings in historic districts, and property valued 
at more than $500,000). Some exceptions to the requirement to obtain an 
appraisal apply, most notably, for nonpublicly traded stock valued at $10,000 
or less. A penalty, enacted in 2006 and assessed against appraisers, applies to 
valuations that result in substantial or gross misstatements of tax liability.169 
163 § 170(f )(8)(B). If the quid pro quo takes the form of intangible religious services, no 
good faith estimate of value is required; rather a statement that such services was the quid pro 
quo is suicient.
164 See Friedman v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.M (CCH) 1175, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-
045, at 258 (inding that the failure by the donee to state that no goods or services were pro-
vided meant that the donee acknowledgment was insuicient).
165 § 170(f )(11).
166 Roger Colinvaux, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Nonprofits & Philanthropy, Enforc-
ing the Enhanced Charitable Deduction: Improved Reporting on the Form 8283 
(2012), available at http://www.urban.org/taxandcharities/upload/Enforcing-the-Enhanced-
Charitable-Deduction.pdf.
167 § 170(f )(11)(C). he appraisal must be “qualiied,” including that it be conducted by a 
“qualiied appraiser.” § 170(f )(11)(E)(i). In general, the appraiser must be an active professional 
with veriiable education and experience in valuing the type of property in question. § 170(f )
(11)(E)(ii)-(iii). Both terms are further explicated in the regulations. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c).
168 Compare Hewitt v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 258, 262-66 (1997) (failure to obtain an 
appraisal means no deduction), with Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 40-42 (1993) 
(deduction allowed when an appraisal was conducted but reported only via the appraisal sum-
mary of Form 8283 and not by a distinct appraisal), and Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 682 
F.3d 189, 194-98 (2d Cir. 2012) (appraisal of a façade easement that merely applied a percent-
age discount to the “before” value without analysis nonetheless satisied regulatory require-
ments that the appraisal use a distinct “method” of appraisal and provide a “basis” for the 
decision).
169 I.R.C. § 6695A.
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Appraisers are required to sign Form 8283 to the efect that the appraiser 
meets the standards of a qualiied appraiser.
D.  Donee Obligations
For contributions of more than $75 in which the donee provides goods or 
services in return (a quid pro quo), the donee must provide written notice of 
the existence and amount of any quid pro quo provided.170 Donee organiza-
tions are required to sign Form 8283 acknowledging receipt of the property 
described. However, the Form states that the donee’s signature “does not rep-
resent agreement with the claimed fair market value” of the contributed prop-
erty.171 Donee organizations must also airm on Form 8283 that if the donee 
sells, exchanges, or otherwise disposes of the donated property within three 
years of receipt, it will ile a Form 8282 with the Service. Form 8282 reports 
any amount received for the property172 and allows the Service to compare 
such amount to the claimed value for deduction purposes.
VIII.  Valuation
he Code allows a charitable contributions deduction; it does not, how-
ever, specify the amount allowed as a deduction.173 For cash gifts, there is 
little question—the amount allowed is the amount of cash contributed. In 
1920, the Service ruled that for contributions of property the amount of the 
deduction was the donor’s cost basis.174 he Service later changed its mind, 
however, opting instead for fair market value.175 Treasury regulations have 
thus long provided that for contributions of property, the amount allowed 
as a deduction is its fair market value176 (subject to the reductions described 
above). he standard deinition for this purpose reads:
he fair market value is the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant 
facts.177
Because the determination of fair market value is fact speciic, controversies 
continue to emerge regularly despite a large number of litigated cases. Indeed, 
valuation often is at the heart of abuses related to the charitable contributions 
170 I.R.C. §§ 6115, 6714.
171 IRS, Form 8283 (2013).
172 I.R.C. § 6050L.
173 I.R.C. § 170.
174 Law Opinion 979, 2 C.B. 148 (1920).
175 Law Opinion 1118, II-2 C.B. 148 (1923).
176 Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1).
177 Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2). Similar, if not identical, language appears in several other places in 
the regulations. See, e.g., Reg. §§ 1.412(c)(2)-1(c)(1), 1.430(g)-1(c)(1)(ii), 1.611-1(d)(2), 1.631-
1(d)(2), 1.897-1(o)(2)(ii), 1.1445-1(g)(7), 20.2031-1(b), 20.2031-6(a), 25.2702-2(c)(1).
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deduction and has led to concerns voiced by administrators178 and to pro-
posals for change.179 Valuation-related disputes also explain many of the 
special property-speciic rules described above: for fractional contributions, 
vehicles, intellectual property, façade easements, penalties on appraisers, and 
taxidermy.180
he Service publishes a valuation guide for its appeals oicers.181 Special 
procedures apply to gifts of art,182 and a Service Art Advisory Panel regularly 
meets in closed session in order to determine the authenticity and fair market 
value of works of art for income, estate, and gift tax purposes.183 he meet-
ings are closed in order to protect the conidentiality of taxpayer information 
presented to the Panel.184
IX.  Estate and Gift Tax Charitable Deductions
Charitable contributions are deductible for purposes of both the estate tax 
and the gift tax.185 Although there are minor linguistic diferences within and 
between the relevant sections,186 those do not portend signiicant legal difer-
ences for most purposes. Under both the estate and the gift tax regimes:
178 See Letter from Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to Sen. Charles 
E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 30, 2005) (“We . . . have persistent 
problems in taxpayers’ valuation of deductions taken for non-cash charitable contributions.”).
179 Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., supra note 121, at 293-307 (proposing 
in most cases a deduction of the donor’s cost basis in lieu of fair market value); see also Roger 
Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 263 (2013) (recommending that any deduction for charitable contributions of property 
be based on the ability to measure the beneit to the donee organization).
180 For a summary of some of these abuses, see Colinvaux, supra note 58, at 23-27.
181 he Internal Revenue Service Valuation Guide for Income, Estate and Gift Taxes—Valua-
tion Training for Appeals Oicers, published periodically by the Service, is available through 
various sources, including leading publishers of major loose-leaf tax services. See also IRS, IRS 
Pub. No. 561, Determining the Value of Donated Property; Tim A. homas, Annota-
tion, Federal Income Tax Charitable Deductions: Property Fair-Market-Value Determinations, 90 
A.L.R. Fed. 402 (1988).
182 See Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627, modiied by Announcement 2001-22, 2001-11 
I.R.B. 895.
183 Cases selected for audit that include an item of artwork valued at $50,000 or more are 
referred to the panel. For iscal year 2011, the Panel reviewed 344 items and recommended 
adjustments to 56% of the appraisals reviewed. Art Advisory Panel of the Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, IRS, Annual Summary Report for Fiscal Year 2011, available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/annrep2011.pdf.
184 Although the proceedings are conidential, notes taken at the meetings may be disclosed 
to the owners of the particular art being discussed. See Bernardo v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 
677, 694 (1995).
185 I.R.C. §§ 2055(a), 2522(a). In addition, although there is no explicit charitable deduc-
tion provision in the Generation Skipping Transfer rules, charities are generally “assigned to 
the transferor’s generation.” I.R.C. § 2651(e)(3)(A)-(B). he statutory chain is a bit tedious, 
but the result is fairly clear: transfers to charities do not trigger the tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2601, 
2611(a), 2612, 2613(a), 2651(e)(3).
186 hey are beyond the scope of this Article to explore. Some are cataloged at Harvey P. 
Dale, supra note 22, at 670 n.75.
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• he deductions are unlimited (i.e., no percentage limitations),187 so 
there is no need for any carryover provisions;
• he special reduction rules that apply for income tax purposes188 do 
not apply;
• he phaseout that has been applied for income tax purposes189 does 
not apply;
• he special donation–substantiation rules that apply for income tax 
purposes190 do not apply (although general substantiation-of-deduction 
requirements are applicable);191 and
• As in the case of the income tax, no deduction is permitted for chari-
table gifts of partial interests,192 except for: (1) donations in the form of 
charitable lead annuity trusts or unitrusts, charitable remainder annuity 
trusts or unitrusts, or pooled income funds;193 (2) gifts of an undivided 
interest in the donor’s entire property;194 (3) remainder interests in per-
sonal residences195 and farms;196 and (4) certain qualiied conservation 
interests.197
A Venn diagram of the income tax, gift tax, and estate tax charitable deduc-
tion provisions would show a considerable overlap but also areas of each that 
difer from the others. It is often desirable to draft documents to focus on the 
intersection to ensure that the charitable donations qualify under each and 
all of the regimes. In almost all cases, inter vivos transfers should attempt to 
qualify for both income and gift tax purposes, lest an income tax deduction 
be allowed but a gift tax be imposed, or vice versa.
X.  Policy Issues
U.S. individuals, corporations, and foundations are generous donors. Total 
gifts in the United States were estimated at $335.17 billion in 2013, of which 
187 In the case of the estate tax, the deduction cannot exceed the entire gross estate. § 2055(d). 
In the case of the gift tax, the deduction is “allowed only to the extent that the gifts therein 
speciied are included in the amount of gifts against which such deductions are applied.” I.R.C. 
§ 2524; Reg. §§ 25.2522(a)-1(c), 25.2524-1.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 94-109.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 115-120.
190 hese special rules, under sections 170(f )(8), 6115, and 6714, are discussed in the text 
supra accompanying notes 157-172.
191 Reg. §§ 20.2055-1(c), 25.2522(a)-1(c).
192 §§ 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2).
193 §§ 2055(e)(2)(A), 2522(c)(2)(A).
194 Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(e)(2)(i), 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(i). he charitable deduction for gift tax 
purposes utilizes the income tax rule for fractional gifts. See supra text accompanying notes 
51-53; see also § 2522(e).
195 §§ 2055(f ), 2522(d); Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(e)(2)(ii), 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(ii).
196 Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(e)(2)(iii), 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(iii).
197 Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(e)(2)(iv), 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(iv).
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$240.60 billion came from living individuals.198 Of this amount, $196.21 
billion, or approximately 81.6%, was by individuals that itemize deductions 
and therefore claim the charitable contributions deduction.199 Notably, a dis-
proportionate amount of itemized contributions is made by wealthy indi-
viduals. For tax year 2011, for example, 21.7% of the amount of charitable 
contributions were by individuals earning $1 million or more of adjusted 
gross income, representing just 0.747% of total returns.200 In addition, a 
high percentage of gifts are not in cash. In 2011, for example, about 24% of 
charitable contributions were of noncash property. Of these contributions, 
41% were made by individuals earning $1 million or more of adjusted gross 
income (again, representing 0.747% of total returns).201
he high volume of annual giving highlights the importance of the chari-
table contributions deduction as a mainstay of the tax law and an important 
facilitator of funding for eligible organizations. Nevertheless, policy issues 
abound, including debate about the role of the deduction in the tax system, 
eiciency concerns, and the appropriateness of allowing a deduction for the 
appreciation in noncash property, among others.
A.  Rationale and Form of the Tax Beneit
he charitable contributions deduction has been viewed as base-deining 
and as an incentive (or subsidy) for charitable giving (or both). he most 
widely-accepted deinition of the proper tax base for an income tax—the 
Haig–Simons deinition—states that income for any period is the sum of (1) 
amounts spent by the taxpayer on personal consumption during the period 
and (2) the change in the taxpayer’s net worth during the period.202 Because 
amounts given to charity no longer appear in the taxpayer’s net worth, the 
question becomes whether such giving should be viewed as personal con-
sumption. If not, the deduction for charitable gifts is an appropriate policy 
198 Giving USA Found., Giving USA 2014: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for 
the Year 2013, at 8 (2014). A further $27.73 billion represented testamentary gifts, $48.96 
billion was given by private foundations, and approximately $17.88 billion came from corpo-
rations.
199 Id. at 216.
200 IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Table 2.1 Returns with Itemized Deductions: 
Sources of Income, Adjustments, Itemized Deductions by Type, Exemptions, and Tax Items, by Size 
of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2011, SOI Tax Stats—Individual Statistical Tables by 
Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/
article/0,,id=96981,00.html (scroll down to “Individual Income Tax Returns with Exemptions 
and Itemized Deductions” red heading; then to “Individual Income Tax Returns with Item-
ized Deductions: Sources of Income, Adjustments, Itemized Deductions by Type, Exemptions, 
and Tax Items” subheading; then to “Published as: Individual Complete Report (Publication 
1304), Table 2.1,” and follow “2011” hyperlink for calculations derived from table).
201 Id.
202 See Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 50 (1938).
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response for deining net income subject to tax and should not be viewed as 
a subsidy.203
he base-deining rationale is a minority view. he more common view 
is that charitable contributions are a form of consumption by the donor, 
and the charitable contributions deduction is a federal subsidy intended to 
encourage giving.204 Under a subsidy view, the deduction for charitable gifts 
can be viewed as a government matching program.205 For example, if a donor 
who itemizes deductions and whose top marginal tax bracket is 35% makes 
a $100 gift to charity and deducts that amount from his income, the net cost 
or “price” of the gift is $65.206 he government, from this viewpoint, is mak-
ing a $35 matching grant to the charity chosen by the donor. he size of the 
matching grant varies directly with the top tax bracket of the donor. hus, the 
government ofers a higher match to wealthier, higher-income taxpayers than 
to less-wealthy, lower-income taxpayers. his regressivity is objectionable to 
some on tax policy grounds; defenders support it as merely an appropriate 
base-deining rule.207
If it were thought desirable to eliminate this regressivity, a credit could 
be provided in lieu of the deduction.208 he amount of the credit could be 
calculated, at least approximately, so as to involve any chosen amount of rev-
enue loss and to simulate an equivalent deduction at any selected target tax 
rate. While this would eliminate the regressivity (because the government’s 
“matching grant” would then be the same at all income levels), it would not 
203 he leading articulation of this view is William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an 
Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 365-66 (1972). See also John K. McNulty, Public 
Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 229, 241 (1984); Peter J. 
Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 85, 94-95, 135 
(1985). See generally Mark P. Gergen, he Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 
Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1988).
204 See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why hey Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” 
Income Tax and Why hey Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831, 834-35 
(1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 Tax L. Rev. 
679, 707 (1988). See generally Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonproit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. 
Rev. 501 (1990); Miranda Perry Fleischer, heorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: he Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 505 (2010).
205 See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute 
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1972).
206 It is assumed for purposes of this simpliied example that no special reduction rules, 
deduction loors, or other limitations or adjustments are applicable.
207 For example, the same regressivity occurs when a sole proprietor deducts expenses, e.g., 
for salaries and rent, incurred in business: a higher income proprietor gets a greater beneit 
from those deductions than a lower income proprietor. For a summary of the policy implica-
tions of a base-deining or subsidy view, see Roger Colinvaux, Rationale and Changing the 
Charitable Deduction, 138 Tax Notes (TA) 1453 (Feb. 25, 2013).
208 he credit would probably have to be refundable if all taxpayers, even those with very low 
incomes, were to be treated equally.
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be possible to justify a credit of this sort under a base-deining rationale.209 
hus, the rationale of how charitable contributions it within the tax system 
matters to the form of any tax beneit. In general, a base-deining rationale 
supports a full ofset to tax for charitable contributions, that is, a deduction, 
whereas a subsidy rationale provides support for changes to the tax beneit 
perhaps in the form of additional caps or by changing to a credit.
here have been numerous proposals to change the charitable contribu-
tions deduction. Some proposals implicitly support the subsidy rationale. For 
example, the Obama Administration proposes capping the value of all item-
ized deductions, including the charitable contributions deduction, at 28% of 
the amount of the expense even if the taxpayer is in a marginal rate bracket 
higher than 28%.210 Another is to switch to a credit or a system of matching 
grants. Two expert panels have recommended one or the other.211
Other proposals support a base-deining rationale. For example, the Tax 
Reform Act of 2014 proposed a substantial increase to the standard deduc-
tion in part to account for charitable contributions.212 his would change the 
means for deducting charitable contributions from an itemized deduction 
to a component of the standard deduction. Although charitable contribu-
tions would remain outside the tax base, the incentive to make contributions 
would be largely eliminated. Under the proposal, the charitable deduction 
then would remain as an incentive (and subsidy) only for the small percent-
age of taxpayers who would continue to itemize deductions.
Some proposals are consistent with both a base-deining and a subsidy 
rationale. For example, deductions could be disallowed for amounts below 
a percentage-of-adjusted-gross-income loor.213 Imposing a loor may be a 
cost-efective way to subsidize charitable contributions. A well-designed loor 
209 For discussion and analysis of several proposals to reform the deduction, see Joseph J. 
Cordes, Re-hinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the Efects of Deicit-
Reduction Proposals, 64 Nat’l Tax J. 1001 (2011). See also Roger Colinvaux, Brain Galle & 
Eugene Steuerle, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Nonprofits & Philanthropy, Evaluating the 
Charitable Deduction and Proposed Reforms 1, 11-18 (2012). For further discussions 
of a credit rather than a deduction for charitable giving, see Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal 
Tax Policy and Charitable Giving 44, 103-04 (1985). See also Gergen, supra note 203, at 
1400-06; McNulty, supra note 203, at 245-47; Wiedenbeck, supra note 203, at 99-102.
210 Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2015 Revenue Proposals 154-55 (2014).
211 The Nat’l Comm’n on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, The Moment of Truth 
30-31 (2010) (recommending a charitable contribution credit with a two percent of adjusted 
gross income loor in lieu of the deduction); see also Debt Reduction Task Force, Restor-
ing America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and 
Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System 34 (2010). he staf of the Senate Finance 
Committee released a summary of options of reform of the charitable deduction. Staff of S. 
Fin. Comm., 113th Cong., Tax Exempt Organizations and Charitable Giving: Senate 
Finance Committee Staff Tax Reform Options for Discussion 4-9 (2013).
212 Tax Reform Act of 2014 § 1403 (Discussion Draft 2014).
213 Id. § 1403(a) (imposing a two percent of adjusted gross income loor on the itemized 
charitable deduction).
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would eliminate the incentive for contributions that would occur with or 
without a deduction and preserve the incentive for contributions in the mar-
gin. A loor is also to a certain extent consistent with a base-deining ratio-
nale. Contributions disallowed by the loor may not afect the ability to pay 
taxes and can be said to represent the private-consumption component of 
some charitable contributions.
B.  Eiciency Concerns
here is uncertainty about how much the income tax deduction for chari-
table giving afects amounts given to charity.214 Economists analyze this in 
terms of “price elasticity”: the extent (expressed as a decimal ratio) by which 
a reduction in the “price” of giving increases such giving.215 he price of a $1 
donation for itemizers is one minus the donor’s top marginal tax rate.216 If 
the price declines by ten percent (e.g., because of an increase in the donor’s 
top marginal tax rate), and if donations, as a result, increase by the same ten 
percent, the price elasticity would be -1.0. If, however, a ten percent reduc-
tion in price produces only an eight percent increase in donations, the price 
elasticity would be -0.8. here is general agreement that the lower the price of 
giving, the more is given to charity, but quantifying the efect has proved to 
be extremely di cult.217 he economic literature has produced estimates of 
price elasticity ranging from -0.5 to -1.75;218 the former number suggests that 
a ten percent decline in the price of giving would increase long-run charitable 
214 he estate tax, of course, exerts a price efect on bequests, even though it only reaches 
fairly large estates. Some simulations have suggested that repeal of the estate tax would reduce 
testamentary charitable gifts by between 24% and 44%. Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard L. 
Schmalbeck, he Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on Nonproit Organizations, in Economic 
Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 211-43 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 
1996). Others disagree, believing that the wealth efect would overwhelm the price efect. For 
a more recent analysis, see Jon Bakija, William Gale & Joel Slemrod, New Evidence on 
the Effects of Taxes on Charitable Bequests (2005). See also Robert McClelland, 
Cong. Budget Office, No. 2004-8, Charitable Bequests and the Repeal of the Estate 
Tax (2004) (concluding that the decline in charitable giving as a result of estate tax repeal 
would be about 22%).
215 See generally Clotfelter, supra note 209; Richard Steinberg, Taxes and Giving: New 
Findings, 1 Voluntas: Int’l J. Voluntary & Nonprofit Orgs. 61 (1990).
216 See supra example in text accompanying note 206.
217 Dean Karlan & John A. List, Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence From 
a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 1774 (2007); see also Joseph 
Cordes, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Nonprofits & Philanthropy, Hauser Ctr. for Non-
profit Orgs., The Cost of Giving: How do Changes in Tax Deductions Affect Chari-
table Contributions? (1999).
218 See Charles T. Clotfelter, he Economics of Giving, in Giving Better, Giving Smarter 
(John W. Barry & Bruno V. Manno eds., 1997).
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giving by only ive percent; the latter suggests that a price decline of ten per-
cent would increase long-run charitable giving by 17.5%.219
Using newly available panel data,220 several leading scholars have found 
difering price elasticities for “transitory,” as opposed to “permanent,” tax rate 
changes,221 concluding that the former are signiicantly smaller in absolute 
terms than the latter, which fall in the range of -0.79 to -1.26.222 he authors 
concede that their research is only a “irst step” and that additional work has 
to be done with panel data “to address how changes in expectations of future 
tax policies . . . afect current individual [charitable] behavior.”223 A more 
recent analysis suggests an elasticity of charitable giving in response to a per-
sistent change in price that is in excess of -1 in absolute value.224
Price elasticities may difer for large donors and small donors. Many believe 
that the price elasticity is lower for lower-income donors, including those 
now generally electing to use the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing 
deductions.225 If so, in estimating the impact of providing a deduction for 
nonitemizers, it is more likely that the revenue foregone would be greater 
than the additional donations stimulated; however, not all observers agree.226
219 Donors of money or property are also more likely to volunteer their time. Some empirical 
work suggests, therefore, that beyond the price elasticity (which only measures price impact 
on gifts of money or property), a reduced price for donations also tends to encourage more 
volunteering. Eleanor Brown & Hamilton Lankford, Gifts of Money and Gifts of Time, 47 J. 
Pub. Econ. 321 (1992); see also Aprill, supra note 114, at 862-64. Other work also considers 
whether increased subsidies are ineicient net of fundraising. See Brain Galle, How Do Non-
proit Firms Respond to Tax Policy? (Boston College Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
320, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443621.
220 Panel data are longitudinal as opposed to cross-sectional data, which are static.
221 Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, and 
Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 371 (2002).
222 Id. at 379.
223 Id. at 381.
224 Jon Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and 
Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 Nat’l Tax J. 615 (2011). Professor Bakija has 
also concluded “that tax incentives for charitable donations . . . succeed in causing donations 
to increase, probably by about as much or more than they cost in terms of tax revenue.” Jon 
Bakija, Tax Policy and Philanthropy: A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the United States and 
Its Implications, 80 Soc. Res. 557, 581 (2013).
225 Charles T. Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How Taxes 
Affect Economic Behavior (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981); Chris-
topher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax Incentives? New 
Evidence, 52 Nat’l Tax J. 195, 203-04 (1999); David H. Eaton, Charitable Contributions and 
Tax Price Elasticities for Nonitemizing Taxpayers, 7 Int’l Advances Econ. Res. 431 (2001); see 
also Cong. Budget Office, Effects of Allowing Nonitemizers to Deduct Charitable 
Contributions 9-11 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/14230. But see 
Amy E. Dunbar & John Phillips, he Efect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: he Case 
of Nonitemizing Taxpayers, 19 J. Am. Tax’n Ass’n 1 (1997).
226 Independent Sector argues that “the nonitemizer deduction included in the Charity Aid, 
Recovery, and Empowerment Act of 2002 would likely stimulate at least $1.15 of charitable 
giving for every $1.00 it costs.” Fact Sheet, Giving In America, IndependentSector.Org 
(2002). For a useful analysis of these issues, see Aprill, supra note 114, at 857-59.
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C.  Deduction for the Appreciated Value of Property
If the base-deining rationale is accepted, allowing a deduction for the 
appreciation in value of property donated to charity without including that 
increase in the income of the donor cannot be justiied.227 To that extent, it 
must be supported, if at all, on the grounds that it is an incentive or subsidy 
for giving. If it were thought desirable to preserve the deduction generally, 
but eliminate the harder-to-justify deduction for appreciation in value of 
property donated, three routes to achieve that could be followed:
1. he deduction could be limited to the adjusted basis of the property 
donated, that is, the deduction for the unrealized appreciation in 
value could be denied, or
2. he deduction could be allowed for the full fair market value of the 
property donated but the gain inherent in the property could be 
included in the donor’s income at the time of the gift, or
3. A deduction could be permitted for the full fair market value of the 
property donated but the charitable donee could be required to pay 
tax on the unrealized appreciation in value at any later time when it 
sells or disposes of the property.
he irst route is similar to some already in the Code for many gifts to public 
charities228 and already is the general rule for gifts to private foundations.229 
his approach was recommended by the Joint Committee on Taxation staf 
in 2005230 and followed in the Tax Reform Act of 2014 but with numer-
ous exceptions.231 he second and third approaches would be novel in that 
context.232 he second requires donors to pay tax even though they do not 
receive any cash or property in exchange for the donated property. None-
theless, because the deduction for the appreciated value is widely viewed as 
227 As Professor Andrews puts it:
Whatever its origin, the fair market value rule must now be viewed as a subsidy or 
artiicial inducement, above and beyond mere tax exemption, for philanthropic giv-
ing. he magnitude of the subsidy is a function of the amount of unrealized appre-
ciation in relation to the basis of the property and the taxpayer’s rates of tax, being 
greatest for taxpayers in highest brackets and with most appreciation.
Andrews, supra note 203, at 372.
228 For example, the special reduction rules discussed in the text accompanying notes 95-98, 
supra, tend to limit the deduction to the adjusted basis of the donated property.
229 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii).
230 Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., supra note 121, at 293-307.
231 Tax Reform Act of 2014 § 1403(c) (Discussion Draft 2014).
232 In other contexts, charitable gifts sometimes trigger gain to the donor. For example, 
charitable donations of installment obligations accelerate gain to the donor. Rev. Rul. 60-352, 
1960-2 C.B. 208; Rev. Rul. 55-157, 1955-1 C.B. 293. Charitable donations of property sub-
ject to indebtedness also trigger gain to the donor. Rev. Rul. 81-163, 1981-1 C.B. 443.
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problematic, this approach has been advocated in recent years.233 he third 
route not only defers, perhaps indeinitely, the imposition of any tax on the 
unrealized appreciation in value but would subject it to tax upon later dispo-
sition of the property at the then-applicable tax rates of the donee rather than 
those of the donor. Consideration might be given to making the irst route 
the default rule but allowing donors to elect to apply the second or, with the 
consent of the donee, the third route in lieu of the irst.
D.  Nonitemizer Deduction and Simpliication
1.  Nonitemizer Deduction
A charitable deduction for nonitemizers has long been a priority for some 
in the charitable sector. Designing a sound nonitemizer deduction234 requires 
confronting and balancing conlicting policies:
• he standard deduction is intended to provide nonitemizers an implicit 
deduction in an amount suicient to substitute for itemized deductions, 
including the charitable contributions deduction. Permitting nonitem-
izers to deduct charitable contributions thus raises two concerns: (1) 
would this erode the simpliication of compliance burden fostered by 
the standard deduction, and (2) if a nonitemizer charitable deduction is 
permitted, should the amount of the standard deduction be reduced to 
take that into account and prevent “double dipping”?
• Because the amounts covered by a nonitemizer deduction are relatively 
modest but the number of people claiming it would likely be large, the 
already lean Service resources might not be able to audit those returns 
efectively, thus giving rise to the perception, if not the reality, of more 
tax fraud.235
hese concerns could be ameliorated, albeit not eliminated, by permitting a 
nonitemizer deduction only above a certain loor amount.236
233 See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization 
of Built-In Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2002); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt 
Organizations and heir Patrons, 67 Tax Law. 451, 498-500 (2014).
234 For a very thoughtful series of articles on how best to design a nonitemizer deduction, see 
C. Eugene Steuerle, Charity Deduction for Nonitemizers: Where Do You Draw the Line?, 86 Tax 
Notes (TA) 1773 (Mar. 20, 2000); C. Eugene Steuerle, Nonitemizers Charitable Deduction: 
he Administration’s Floor Plan, 86 Tax Notes (TA) 1625 (Mar. 13, 2000); C. Eugene Steuerle, 
he Right Way to Extend Charitable Deductions to Nonitemizers, 86 Tax Notes (TA) 1297 (Feb. 
28, 2000). See also Cong. Budget Office, supra note 225; C. Eugene Steuerle, Allowing 
Charitable Deductions for hose Who Don’t Itemize, 48 Tax Notes (TA) 633 (July 30, 1990); 
Joseph Cordes, John O’Hare & C. Eugene Steuerle, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Nonprof-
its & Philanthropy, Extending the Charitable Deduction to Nonitemizers: Policy 
Issues and Options (2000), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/310338.html.
235 See Aprill, supra note 114, at 859-62 (discussing these administrative concerns).
236 he imposition of a ceiling, rather than a loor, on such deductions appears unwise: 
although a ceiling would mitigate the expected adverse tax revenue impact, it fails to respond 
to the other policy considerations mentioned in the text.
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2.  Simpliication
he charitable contributions deduction has become one of the most com-
plex sections of a complex revenue code. he fact of the deduction’s complex-
ity may undermine its incentive efects, as donors are unable easily to calculate 
the amount of the tax beneit and the true cost of giving. Even absent any 
signiicant change in policy or approach to the deduction, a simpliication 
project could improve the efectiveness of the incentive at little cost.237
XI.  Conclusion
his Article surveys the main federal tax law rules and policies relating 
to the deduction for charitable contributions. he charitable deduction is 
a mainstay of the federal income tax. Given the considerable complexity of 
the rules, however, careful planning for and understanding of the many legal 
intricacies is often required to realize the beneits of the deduction fully.
237 See Daniel Halperin, Urban Inst. Ctr. on Nonprofits & Philanthropy, The Char-
itable Contribution Deduction: Section 170 Reorganized (2012), available at http://
www.urban.org/publications/412771.html (outlining a reorganized charitable deduction).
